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Abstract
Purposely modular, this protocol enables customization of several
protocol properties, including the consensus properties implemented,
blockchain type, the roots used, and virtual machine opcodes, among oth-
ers. These modules enable implementing parties to control the behavior
of their economy, with a minimal amount of effort, and no sacrifice in
participant cryptoeconomic quality. This work also demonstrates the sim-
plification of the developer experience by abstracting away all technological
details, except basic CRUD-based operations, using various programming
languages. We demonstrate the mechanism design approach taken, and
formalize a process for deploying populations of blockchain economies at
scale. The framework shown includes adequate tooling for simulation, de-
velopment, deployment, maintenance, and analytic-based decision making.
Lastly, we introduce an expressive programming language for the purpose
of creating, and interacting with the cryptoeconomy designed by the im-
plementing developer.
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Manifesto
Though not exclusively the case, the state of the present for this
blockchain status quo is a direct reflection of the technological, economical,
and game theoretic frameworks of yesteryear. The blockchain ecosystem
of today steadily moves towards more generalized, general-purpose archi-
tectures aimed at being applicable to as many problem spaces as possible.
Typically, in order to alter a blockchain protocol’s design, a developer must
embark on a reverse engineering effort of which may seem daunting to even
seasoned developers. This is a severe hinderance to a subset of the devel-
oper community interested in experimenting with building decentralized
solutions.
At the time of writing, the standard blockchain protocols and plat-
forms consist of a single designed protocol, upon which one can either
deploy a blockchain application, or a private, and dedicated blockchain
network – these protocols address the usability of implementations using
blockchain. Developers can create "smart contracts", but this level of de-
velopment does not include customization of the behaviors of the protocol
itself. Developing "smart contracts" is in the service of including addi-
tional computations within a blockchain – not holistically customizing and
dictating which computations happen within the chain fundamentally.
Today, there lacks simplified developer experiences, of which lead to
third party wrappers around the protocol to fill these gaps. Cloud comput-
ing companies are beginning to offer abstraction layers around protocols as
an attempt to offer "enterprise" blockchain solutions. These endeavors still
do not offer customization opportunities regarding the protocol. Only A
small number of applications where you truly need borderless global cen-
sorship resistant neutral platform to establish trust and immutability that
cannot be attacked, or compromised by anyone, is not many. However, for
the developers who seek it, developer experience should be taken with the
highest priority.
By relieving the brain of all unnecessary work, a good abstraction sets
us free to concentrate on more advanced problems, and in effect increases
the mental power of the participants. It is the democratization of decen-
tralized technologies that is the long-term goal of this project – not the
simple data structure, and concept blockchains are built upon.
There is no room for Tribalism when the mission is democ-
ratization
8
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Chapter 1
State of Today
Introduction
The introduction of Blockchain to the world has been covered by writ-
ers from several backgrounds; this paper does not aim to serve as yet an-
other proponent of the usage of Blockchain ecosystems. Several implemen-
tations of Blockchain systems exist today, and the variation between them
can be nonexistent, subtle, or dramatic. One property of the these cryp-
toeconomic systems is that the development teams tend to believe their
implementations are the "best" blockchain implementation for their pro-
posed uses – of which can be specific, or general.
These platforms can be purposed for specific solution spaces, such as
Bitcoin, and others are more general such as Ethereum. This project is
purposed to introduce not only a protocol development platform, but a
change in the blockchain development paradigm. Such a change can result
in current platforms becoming old-fashionaed, but it is in the spirit of
evolution for cryptoeconomic design.
At the time of this writing, there is an unspoken/well-spoken tension
existing within the "Cryptocurrency" world. However, these arguments
stem from disagreements about protocol design, protocol governance, game
theoretic and cryptoeconomic design, or interpersonal discrepancies. These
interactions not only display less-than-professional behavior, but also dis-
tract the public towards caring more about the implementation details of
any blockchain protocol – of which are arbitrary, and do not universally ap-
ply. Being a concept, and design approach, individual blockchain-based im-
plementations should never be communicated as generalized, or universally
"correct", as this is only as strong as the assumptions made in designing
the implemented protocol itself.
10
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Public Perception
There are various ways in which the concepts of blockchains are taught,
and some closely reflect the truth, others do not; we believe this is due
to purposeful simplification of blockchain protocols. It is understood that
explaining complexed ideas at a high level works, but there are ramifications
with doing so. The individuals being educated, if they are shielded from
important details, may miss the "magic", or actual "power" behind the
concept.
This has led to some people denouncing blockchains as nothing but
"inefficient databases", "hashed linked lists", and so on. It isn’t the case
that these are wrong, but these simplifications, abstract away any cryp-
toeconomic property of using them. To discuss Cryptoeconomic systems
without seriously considering how incentives, and economics influence the
behavior within it, is a disservice to the discipline.
2.1 Public confusion
At the current time of writing, popular culture tends to use the term "The
Blockchain" when referring to this space, and its techniques/technologies.
However, this convention has led to wide spread confusion, and ignorance.
To understand the power behind designing, and deploying a blockchain
powered economy, one must at least be introduced to the discipline of
Cryptoeconomics, and mechanism design. Referring to a concept, using
"the" as a prefacing term, indicates a sole instance of that concept. "The
blockchain" implies, there is one, of which people default to being Bitcoin,
or Ethereum. It is seldom taught in mainstream as a concept existing in
the intersection of cryptography, computer science, and economics.
Current Implementations
Current implementations of Blockchain networks, from bitcoin, to all
platforms at the current time of writing, all have one thing in common:
the blockchain structure, mechanisms, virtual machines, and operation
codes are all ideated, designed, and developed by the creators of the sys-
tem. Though the systems are open source, one must reverse engineer the
blockchain platform itself, and build from it’s source code. The more com-
plexed the open source design is, the higher the knowledge and talent re-
quirement is for anyone wishing to alter its design. At the time of writing, it
is uncommon that a decentralized protocol is designed to be customizable,
and still maintain a flexible, reliable, and expressive core.
No matter how one perceives the purpose of a Blockchain, one common
11
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purpose of any implementation is storage. This is because at any point in
time, from the genesis block of any blockchain, there exist > 1bit of infor-
mation within it. Since the platform’s developers decide how information
is stored, and what to store, we must abide by their design. Platforms do
allow developers to store additional information on the blockchain used,
but developers have no say so regarding what is fundamentally stored on
the blockchain, or how it is stored.
The argument can be made that the developers have done the R&D
work to decide what "best practices" are, but this results in external devel-
opers being "locked out" of the development process; in other words, de-
velopment tends to be centralized in practice. From a customer experience
perspective, this is hard to justify in a world of many talented developers.
For platforms that take developer experience into account in the highest
regard, this is unacceptable since the platform is to "serve" developers.
Since Blockchains store information fundamentally, we can draw an
analogy to database architectures of years past, and present. There exists a
plethora of proprietary, and open-source database systems, and paradigms.
The evolution of NoSQL & SQL have allowed developers to choose the
schema of their databases, and allow for a wider usage space.
12
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Predecessors
The influence of Bitcoin
Bitcoin has seemingly convinced cryptoeconomic-enthusiasts that a
singular blockchain protocol is the answer to many problems, and this has
resulted in a "protocol race" for the supreme, most usable, and most general
platform. This is the main motivation for platforms such as Ethereum,
Cardano, Wave, and a host of others. This assumption has led developers
to compete regarding their blockchain ecosystem designs. Bitcoin can be
viewed as a transaction-based state machine, whereby transactions in the
network progress the protocol’s state from σt → σt+1 through Υ, the state
transition function.
σt+1 ≡ Υ(σt, T ) (2.1)
A state transition function, Υ, can be thought of as Alice sending $1
to Bob, and that "sending" action transitions the system’s state from Alice
having $x, to Alice having $x− 1, and Bob having $y + 1; Bitcoin can be
viewed this same way using this analogy.
1.1 Mechanism in Bitcoin
Bitcoin, by adopting more interest has raised concern regarding fairness
across the network. Users cannot simply mine on their Personal Computers
these days,
Bitcoin’s influence has resulted in large organizations, and groups,
along with dedicated hardware, focusing resources on securing the net-
work. The difference in resources between these groups, and the average
interested party, can be seen as unfair. Some of these groups are even
trashing their units. In addition, some speculators believer a small group
13
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of entities own a large subset of Bitcoin. This can even been seen by explor-
ing for the "richest" accounts on the network. If true, hinders promotion
of the project, and threatens the very democratic ethos of Bitcoin’s vision.
The Coase theorem states, with zero or little transaction cost and
unambiguous rights to assets, the market could reach what is know as
"Pareto efficiency" regarding the allocation of resources, despite to whom
the property is allocated.
The Bitcoin project initially attempted two approaches to creating a
"fair" system:
1. allocating Bitcoins to all users according to the number of the nodes,
namely one-IP-address-one-vote;
2. allocating Bitcoins to the miners according to the computing power,
namely one-CPU-one-vote.
Due to security issues concerning users being able to easily access
many IP Addresses, one-CPU-one-vote began the approach after release.
The Miners processing transactions provides a fundamental incentive mech-
anism for the network because Miners receive "reward" for doing so. The
total computing energy created by miners served as a fundamental security
measure, supporting activities (transactions) by non-miners.
Miners also pay computing resources to users, as a total, of the net-
work, in exchange for ownership of Bitcoin. This is viewed as transaction
fees, but support the network as another incentive mechanism. If the com-
puting power expened by miners ends up costing more than the revenue
generated from mining, miners would be incentivized to offer as much com-
puting power. The bigger the difference between mining costs, and user-
purchasing costs, the higher the incentive for additional miners to join the
network becomes.
1.2 Altcoins
Alternative coins have been introduced since Bitcoin, the majority of which
are direct GIT clones of the original Bitcoin source code; this has further
pushed the ethos of "Best Protocol" wins by project teams developing on
top of it.
This cultural ethos again embodies evolution towards either designing
a protocol for a specific use case, of which may not work applied to anything
else, or the most robust, multipurpose protocol design.
In figure 2.1, we use 6 GIT metrics to analyze blockchain projects. We
begin with 500 tokens from the Coin Market Cap (CMC) index, and focus
on the top 17 projects for clarity. The GIT metrics used:
14
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Figure 2.1: 6 dimensional GIT behavior visualized using principal com-
ponent analysis. Right: (Red) Bitcoin Variant GIT Projects. (Blue) Non-
Bitcoin Variant projects.
1. Commits
2. Contributors
3. Number of Repositories
4. Number of Github Organization Users
5. Number of Releases
6. Number of Branches
For metrics regarding a single repository, we simply use the most ac-
tive, and most used/active repository within the project’s GIT organiza-
tion. For example, for the Ethereum organization, we use their C++ Aleth
project, of which has the highest amount of commits under their organiza-
tion, and is still active. This approach on the metrics to use from GIT is
arbitrary, and not quantified beyond this. We perform the same logic for
each of the 500 tokens.
In figure 2.1, we use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to view GIT
activity. In the right plot in figure 2.1, the red cluster contains projects that
are forked from Bitcoin’s source code (called "Bitcoin Variants"), and the
blue cluster contains projects not forked from Bitcoin. Clearly, a cluster
emerges for projects forked from Bitcoin, based on their GIT metrics (which
isn’t surprising given the fact that GIT metrics transfer with the forking of a
project), we claim GIT metrics provide meaningful insight for determining
the behavior of a project, project team, and inheritance of the repository.
This is also the case when using the 500 total tokens on CMC.
15
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1.3 Protocol Debates
At the time of writing, amongst the thought leaders in the decentralized
technology space, there exists a theme of argumentation over protocol de-
sign.
Block Size
A famous, and ongoing debate exists regarding the preferred block size
in the Bitcoin network. There have been many hard forks of the original
Bitcoin source code, and has resulted in a myriad of schools of thought.
Roger Ver, a well-known thought leader, and early investor in Bitcoin-based
companies argues, sided with Satoshi Nakamoto, that increasing the block
size to whatever it is required to be, is a feasible long term solution due to
"Moore’s Law". However, research strongly indicates the trend of Moore’s
Law slowing down, and may come to a halt. This is due to the space
constraints with creating more transistors fitting in a predefined space. It
not only becomes more difficult to practically place more transistors in
a space, but their exists other physics based problems with creating ever
smaller logic gates. See CITE.
Simply increasing the block size is a naive approach to better design,
and wider adoption. Moreover, the requirement to choose ever more clever
methods, some of which change a fundamental behavior of the system, all
to see the success of a protocol, is more of a design shortcoming on the
shoulders of the protocol engineers, and less of an economic property. This
is a direct ramification of develop a one-size fits all protocol – though it
was specific to the finance industry.
Source Code Ownership
Since the original Bitcoin source code repository has changed ownership,
controversy has emerged regarding what the correct design choices should
be moving forward. This has brought about many proposal towards im-
proving Bitcoin. These proposals are decided upon not by the author of
the original Bitcoin code, but the owners of the repository at the time –
not to mention it being "forkable", since it is open sourced. A notable
"improvement" was moving from "First Seen First Safe", the transactions
that are seen first, get included into the block, to "replace by fee", where
you can replace a seen transaction with a different transaction up until any
point it is included in a block. This went from transactions being basically
"instant", due to being "unremovable" as soon as it’s seen by the protocol,
to being able to be replaced based on the amount of the transaction fee
relative to other transactions.
16
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This is a direct ramification of a lack of direct guidance under an open
source project; there are ramifications to open-sourced software. However,
the public, or "participating" public, should always have the tools available
to verify every aspect of any blockchain implementation, or else the protocol
is useless in the decentralized space.
1.4 Global Attack Resistance
An aspect of Bitcoin’s story, that often goes unnoticed, is the effect of
the project "flying under the radar" for a number of years. By the time
Bitcoin reached mainstream attention, the network already built a his-
tory of hashing power performed by the miners securing the network. For
any blockchain based cryptoeconomy using a security mechanism similar
to Proof-of-Work, to scale today, the implementation must reach "scale"
before it is attacked "at scale". In other words, it must possess a strong
enough economic base to resist attack, also known as the "security margin"
of a system. If the network is attacked at a lesser scale than the scale of
its security margin, is may withstand attack.
Any motivated attacker with enough hashing power, can create an
alternate history of the chain, built from the same genesis block, that has
a longer, and still "valid" chain; This can be difficult to deal with for
any protocol implemented. If you have a innovative consensus algorithm,
and people think its going to be valuable, and think it will be valuable
enough to "further", they may also believe it is valuable enough to attack.
Any newly implemented protocol, or network, may not have a blockchain
with a high enough security margin to resist a coordinated attack. The
notion that Bitcoin has withstood attacks is an important property of its
implementation, and enables many of its benefits.
1.5 Process Consensus
Process consensus is a process of debate and proposal that occurs in the
development community. On several platforms (mainly a code repository),
users submit improvement proposals, or "modifications" to the rules of the
system. By gathering, debating, and trying to reach a process consensus,
if enough people agree with the proposal, it may be taken further for per-
formance testing. Once a user, or users provide a reference implementation
that demonstrates the change, some performance analysis on a "Test Net-
work", and an iterative developer review, it is eventually implemented in
the core reference implementation – this is called reference consensus. In
order for the software to propagate, nodes must upgrade, and this requires
consensus among the constituencies.
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1.6 Ossification
After a while, the protocol gets embedded into many implementations, and
thusly becomes harder to upgrade/change. This is similar to the effects
of the ossification of IPV4, which caused the long term effort to upgrade
to IPV6. Since protocol innovation becomes harder over time, proposed
solutions require innovating on higher protocol levels. Each layer below
the layer of innovation gradually become more ossified.
Influence of Ethereum
With the invention of Ethereum, (by Vitalik Buterin. et al), the no-
tion of smart contracts has taken on a more general purpose, compared to
the "scripting" in Bitcoin’s implementation. The approach of developing a
virtual machine, and scripting language for a general purpose protocol has
served as a catalyst for the belief of "best protocol wins". Exposing a tur-
ing complete scripting language comes with fundamental security concerns.
This has led development teams to attempt to build "any" blockchain ap-
plication on top of the system, and other development teams to build com-
peting general purpose protocols. This work proposes moving away from
the general purpose protocol approach, towards dedicated, purpose-built
blockchains for a given decentralized solution.
Also purposed as a transaction-based state machine, similar to Bitcoin,
Ethereum attempts to use the transaction model to invoke a state transfer
function, while keeping a record of these transitions; Ethereum defines a
state transition function to be Υ, transitioned by way of a transaction,
T . Since the Ethereum protocol has been in development, the developers’
commitment to their model result in constantly proposing upgrades to it’s
protocol design, and network properties – instead of changing fundamental
design characteristics of the platform itself. This is a testament to the
evolution of techniques used in the decentralized space.
Similar to Bitcoin, but more formalized in the Ethereum work, the
subsequent state is defined as,
σt+1 ≡ Π(σ, B) (2.2)
where Π is the block-level state transition function, of which is a func-
tion of the state σ, and the block B [6].
2.1 The Halting Problem
Turing complete systems succumb to the problem of not being able to deter-
mine whether or not a command executed by a turing machine will return a
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result, or run forever. Concretely, the halting problem is undecidable over
turing machines. To circumvent this, the Ethereum project invented this
notion of "Gas", an economic property of the system. Around the time of
writing, Ethereum users spent an all-time high to send transactions on one
day. "Gas" is a measurement of computational "effort", and functuates by
demand. These economic principles of the system are decided upon by the
protocol developers. Whether a program executes correctly, or throws an
error, the submitted of the transaction still has to pay "gas".
2.2 Comparing GIT Behavior
Building from figure 2.1, by comparing several tokens listed on a cryptocur-
rency index, GIT behavior provides insight for development activities, and
more. Since the majority of blockchain platforms are open sourced, we can
use this to analyze past, present, and potentially future development. All
measurements are of the time of writing CMC data analysis (June-August
2018).
Figure 2.2: Commit behavior. Five right-most projects are Ethereum,
Bitcoin, Litecoin, IOHK (Cardano), and Bitcoin ABC.
Amongst the top 17 projects, Ethereum’s Aleth project maintains the
highest amount of commits. Not surprisingly, as many projects under
Ethereum’s general-purpose approach are actively under development.
In figure 2.3, we show the number of contributors for the repository
used in this analysis (most used & most active). This is interesting, be-
cause several of the top projects in this category are Bitcoin Variants –
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Figure 2.3: Contributors behavior. Five right-most projects are Bitcoin,
Litecoin, Bitcoin ABC, Bitcoin Unlimited, and Dash
thus inheriting the number of Contributors during their initial repository
forking.
Figure 2.4 Ethereum is amongst the average within the sample shown,
slightly above average on branches, and above average on releases.
The insight from figure 2.5 is noticing Ethereum leading the pack of
17 in total number of repositories under the organization account. It is
also second regarding the number of organization users. This coincides
with collaborative nature of development activity on Ethereum, and the
amount of rapid innovation (users creating new repositories).
The popularity of Ethereum has influenced new protocols to adopt
the same methodologies, and design principles. This may be changing as
time progresses, but the fact Ethereum has shown developers care about
performing activity on a blockchain beyond financial applications.
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Figure 2.4: Contributors, Releases, and Branches behavior. Five right-
most projects are Bitcoin, Litecoin, Bitcoin ABC, Bitcoin Unlimited, and
Dash
Figure 2.5: Organizational Users for the project’s Github Organization.
Five right-most projects are Ethereum, IOHK (Cardano), Stellar, Hyper-
ledger, and Ripple.
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Chapter 3
Current Problems
Challenges
Showing challenges
1.1 Decentralization
A purely decentralized ecosystem would exist in a state where every node
within the ecosystem has equal priviledges in a decision, or an equal amount
of resources within the system, etc. Whether that decision be to validate a
piece of information, or to decide what is a source of truth, it still remains
a decision to be made in the system.
Bitcoin’s blockchain protocol introduces a tradeoff among consensus
speed, bandwidth, and security. By improving the former two, one intro-
duces an increased number of forks, leading to a loss of the mining power
that secures the system and to reduced fairness [8].
This three-way tradeoff, however, is not inherent in decentralized cryp-
tocurrencies. The GHOST protocol [9] of Sompolinsky et al. as well as
Lewenberg et al. [10] demonstrate that fairness and mining power utiliza-
tion can be improved by changing the chain selection rule, in particular, by
being inclusive to forks outside the main chain as well. In more recent work,
Bitcoin-NG [9] demonstrates that the inherent tradeoffs in Bitcoin can be
eliminated with an alternative blockchain protocol, offering a consensus
delay and bandwidth limited only by the Network Plane.
1.2 Scalability
Scalability typically refers to a blockchain network not being required
to hold knowledge every "transaction" in a system. Currently, many
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blockchain consensus protocols (eg. Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Tender-
mint) have a challenging limitation: every fully participating node in the
network must process every transaction. Recall that blockchains possess
the quality of decentralization,which means every node on the network pro-
cesses the same source of "truth".
While a decentralized consensus mechanism offers some critical ben-
efits, such as fault tolerance, a stronger guarantee of security, political
neutrality, and authenticity, it comes at the cost of scalability today. The
amount of data a blockchain can process can never exceed the capacity of
a single node participating in the network – without introducing serious
sacrifices in security guarantees. In fact, a blockchain can become sub-
optimal as more nodes are added to its network due to inter-node latency
that logarithmically increases with every additional node.
1.3 Overhead
To develop the simplest local application on the Ethereum platform, for
instance, requires us to download a "wallet" to our machine. Otherwise,
we have to pay money to test our application, or receive the currency from
a testnet.
Would developers be willing to accept any decrease in central-
ization if it allowed them to not only develop faster, but also fully
deploy faster?
Developers can create a private network from a genesis block, but they
must still abide by the rules implemented by the developers of Ethereum.
Developers can also alter the Ethereum Core code base, but this requires
much errort. In addition to develop a custom use case using an Ethereum
smart contract, developers must learn the Solidity programming language,
This passes additional effort onto the developer, and not the system. This
is a ramification driven by the assumption that one should develop the
"best", general purpose protocol.
1.4 Capabilities
With current blockchain implementations, their may be a limit on the size
of data a developer is allowed to "store", a specific hash function used in the
implementation, or a specific fee structure imposed upon the users. This
is caused by developers not participating in the design of these cryptoeco-
nomic rules. This article proposes a system to enable these decisions to be
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made by developers, upon the developers choosing to do so. Design deci-
sions yielded to the developer are not a centric concern for the developer
of blockchain ecosystems today.
Providing a proprietary turing complete programming language may
not be the answer, as it addresses the customization concern at a much
higher level, and specific to smart-contracts – not the cryptoeconomic sys-
tem as a whole. Providing a turing complete language does solve the con-
cern of customization for developers, but along with the implicit challenges
associated with it. The overall concept of a blockchain, consensus algo-
rithms, and cryptoeconomics proves to be a difficult topic for many de-
velopers. Adding additional, arbitrary complexity only complicates the
development process.
1.5 Evolution
Today, blockchain ecosystems succumb to the requirement of implement
new "features" to their design, and some need to "invent" ideas of how to
handle problems as the design evolves.
1.6 Simulation Tools
Many blockchain systems today lack meaningful, and powerful developer
tools for simulation. In Ethereum for example, one must download lo-
cal tools onto ones machine for any simulation. This project also aims
to explore exposing useful developer tools for simulation of an arbitrary
economic design.
1.7 Startup Time
There exists not a platform for quick blockchain simultation, debugging,
and production setup/deployment. The development process for may plat-
forms today require many steps of preparation, and education. This project
aims to enable a familiar workflow for developers to test decentralized ideas.
1.8 Applicability
Platforms like Ethereum, having a turing complete language allows devel-
opers to model any problem, assuming they are willing to use the rules
of the Ethereum platform. This platform enables developer-centered cus-
tomization capable of re-creating Ethereum, let alone any blockchain ar-
chitecture. For example, one can expose a programming language to not
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only create, manage, and deploy a smart contract, but to also deploy an
Ethereum clone if one wished to do so.
The power behind such a platform allows developers to simply deploy
the most naive, simple Blockchain economy, or a complexed ecosystem with
"smart functionality". The notion of a "smart contract" is arbitrary, and
only reflects the idea of a logic-based, binding agreement between parties
that exist on a blockchain. This idea can be called, a "smart contract",
"smart object", or a "bubble gum easter egg", the notion is the same.
1.9 Developer Friendliness
In order to become a node within the Bitcoin, or Ethereum networks, one
must deploy the platform’s core source code onto a computer wishing to
join the network. This can be an arduous task for a lesser experienced
software developer. Developers have the option to use the core source code
of one of these blockchain platforms, and deploy a private network, starting
from the genesis block. Developers can also alter the genesis block from
which to start a new network.
In order for developers to alter any property of the implemented pro-
tocol, such as the consensus algorithm used, the hashing algorithm, or the
size of each block, the developer has to alter the core source code of the
protocol. This can lead to unexpected behavior of the protocol, but is
a necessary step for developers seeking a more customized protocol. It
is a difficult challenge to shoulder the load of designing the perfect pro-
tocol, or the most general purpose. However platforms today inherently
commit to their protocol design, and search for ways to apply their pro-
tocol to solve problems. It is our belief that it is more feasible to design
a protocol designing process for developers to develop, test, deploy,
and maintain customized blockchain protocols, at scale, and with the op-
tion of abstracting away all operational details of the developer’s protocol
design/implementation.
1.10 Turing Completeness
A computer is Turing complete if it can solve any problem that a Tur-
ing machine can, given an appropriate algorithm and the necessary time
and space/memory. When applied to a programming language, this phrase
means that it can fully exploit the capabilities of a Turing complete com-
puter. One of the main appeals of platforms such as Ethereum is the
availability of a turing complete programming language. However, if some-
thing is turing complete, as any other benefit, there arises consequences.
This consequence can manifest itself in the form of security concerns.
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For a language such as Bitcoin script, being that it is turing incom-
plete, there are theoretically infinite problems such that a turing incomplete
language cannot solve. By the same theorem, there is a finite set of prob-
lems such a language can solve. This theoretical constraint, though true,
can be over exaggerated, and can depend purely on the implementation.
Meaning, the cardinality of the finite set of problems a turing incomplete
program can solve may still very high, from the perspective of practical
implementation.
Since the number of computations required in a turing complete lan-
guage is potentially unbounded above, a malicious miner could always in-
clude a block with a transaction purposed for rewarding themselves with
fees, in an loop. This could also happen recursively in a non-turing com-
plete language.
Figure 3.1: Regarding cryptoeconomic protocol design, there are several
design decisions to be made, of which all influence protocol behavior
1.11 Security
Security can refers to being able to withstand an attack by greaterthan%1
of the network. Systems such as Bitcoin assume at least %51 of the network
is "honest"; "honest" referring to not malicious, and following the rules –
this is known as "honest" majority.
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1.12 Capacity Increase
To increase capacity, it isn’t a case of using single methods to solve the
problem. Developers are choosing many approaches, and combining them.
The limitations of the amount of transactions that can be processed is
bounded by a few factors. One of course being morse law, and the speed
of light. More practically, the limitations include
1. Overlay Networks
2. Blocksize
3. Message Propagation
4. Optimizations in Validation
5. Optimizations in Processing
1.13 Methods
Overlay networks allow developers to create a customize protocol layer on
top of the main protocol. This is being used in many protocol implementa-
tions external to Bitcoin, and is not foreign for Bitcoin itself. The default
block size for Bitcoin was 1mb, and have had many proposals to increase
it, all with different reasoning. The block size limits the amount of fixed
size transactions that can be inserted into it.
Reasons for Modularity
One of the reasons so many protocol frameworks exist today is the
amount of permutations among the different protocol properties. Illus-
trated in figure 3.1, protocols may differ by the hashing algorithms used,
to the consensus properties exhibited, even to the size of each block within
the chain. This permutation set of potential protocol behaviors/proper-
ties is one of the principal justifications for developing a framework of
which allows developers to choose the behaviors that maximally benefit
their decentralized use case. Figure 3.1 shows how protocol governance,
block creation time, hashing algorithm, block size, consensus mechanism,
and other protocol properties are treated as variables within the system –
among others.
Whenever a team of protocol developers decide on protocol behaviors
without taking into account the potential freedom requirements of other
developers, it leads to centralized, and difficult-to-alter design decisions
being finalized.
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Developer Privilege Asymmetry
There exists an imbalanced set of privileges between core protocol
developers, and any other developer accessing the open sourced project.
The core developer(s) of the protocol possess the following privileges:
1. Decide cryptoeconomic rules of the network
2. Decide on any fundraising efforts
3. Decide development decisions
Comparatively, any "external" developer(s) (a developer not existing
within the core development team) possesses the following privileges:
1. anyone/some public can mine/forge
2. Anyone can create a transaction/smart contract
3. Anyone can download the protocol’s source code (protocol trans-
parency)
4. Anyone can view activity
5. Anyone can propose changes
6. Anyone can begin a new protocol from original source (usually a fork)
Code Complexity
The Curse of Code Complexity (CoCC) claims that higher skill-levels
are required by any developer looking to take advantage of a complicated,
but open-sourced code base. OSS (Open Sourced Software) is built around
transparency of code. The more complexed the code base is for a project,
the higher the knowledge requirement is for any developer seeking to make
changes to it. Blockchain protocols already introduce complexed ideas, and
concepts for many developers to deeply comprehend at the time of writing.
Adding to that existing complexity is not conducive to developers looking
to experiment with cryptoeconomic development as the learning curve can
become steeper than necessary.
To develop a customizable cryptoeconomic protocol from an existing
project isn’t ideal for the average developer for the following reasons:
1. Must integrate all protocol configurations into that existing protocol
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2. For most, if not all protocols, if you alter the protocol significantly, it
will no longer be compatible with the network (forking)
Many projects aim to be the "glue" binding public blockchains, but in-
teroperability, does not guarantee better developer experience. This project
aims to lessen the learning curve, and barrier-to-development for the aver-
age developer interested in decentralized cryptoeconomic design.
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The Discipline of Mechanism
Design
Introduction
Using mechanism design, we can work backwards from a socially ac-
ceptable outcome amongst participants, to a set of fundamental behaviors
performed by the agents within a game theoretic framework. Mechanism
design plays a central role in designing cryptoeconomies. We define behav-
iors we would like network nodes to perform. Using these desired behaviors,
we construct incentives for the purpose of promoting "honest", or "truth-
ful" behavior.
A mechanism involves a finite set of participants, and a set of social
decisions to be made. Voting examples are common when explaining Mech-
anism Design, so consider a group of voters wishing to vote upon a set of
candidates; the candidates will be chosen by society as a whole. Each par-
ticipant’s information, usually private, will be referred to as a signal, or the
participants "type". The participants report their types to the mechanism,
which represents their preference regarding the candidates. For example,
participant 1 has a preference for candidate A, opposed to candidate B.
The participant’s type can also represent others type of private infor-
mation to the mechanism. A probabilistic common prior can also exist over
the distribution of participant types. Choosing the "best" social decision is
dependent on the participant types. We define a decision function mapping
types to social decisions.The utility of a participant is a function from their
reported type, which may not be reported truthfully, and the output of the
decision function.
A social choice function maps reported types to actual outcomes, and
this function can possess non-monetary, and monetary aspects. The entity
constructing a mechanism has direct influence on the choice of the mecha-
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nism, but does not have direct influence regarding the participants, or their
reported & true types. These components make up the environment within
which the mechanism works.
We assume an agent knows only their own parameters, but not those of
other participants. The designer of the mechanism knows only the environ-
ment space, Θ, and the goal function, F , that is, the class of environments
for which a mechanism is to be design and the criterion of desirability [12].
Other assumptions can be made as the field of mechanism design is large,
and malleable.
In formal notation, we write
F : Θ→ Z (4.1)
where Z is the outcome space. In economic models, the outcome
space is usually a vector space, but we can take the space of outcomes to
be Z ∈ R.
A mechanism pi can also be viewed as a process for message exchange.
In equilibrium form, consists of three component,
1. message space, M
2. equilibrium message correspondence, µ : Θ→M
3. outcome function h, h : M → Z
Let pi = (M,µ, h). The message space, M consists of messages avail-
able for exchange. We take the message space to be of finite dimensions in
Euclidean space. The group equilibrium message correspondence, µ, holds
a relation between an environment, θ, and the set of messages, µ(θ), that
are equilibrium or stationary messages for all agents. These are messages
each participant deems as acceptable when the environment is θ.
The outcome function maps messages into outcomes. Thus, the mech-
anism pi = (M,µ, h) when operated in an environment θ leads to the
outcomes h(µ(θ)) in Z. The mechanism can be deterministic, and reliably
output the same decision and payout, or can be probabilistic/stochastic
according to some criteria.
The goal of mechanism design is to generate a mechanism that incen-
tivizes rational participants to perform specific behavior, based upon their
private information, thus leading to socially desirable outcomes. A mecha-
nism is said to "implement" a social choice function if, in equilibrium, the
mapping from types to outcomes is the same as the mapping that is to be
chosen by the social choice function.
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Using several aspects of mechanism design, we can incentive partici-
pants in desirable ways, and construct games within which users have no
incentive to deviate from behaviors we wish for them to perform. There are
several methods to impose dominant strategies, where participants have no
reason to behave unfavorably.
The Revelation Principle
One of the foundations of mechanism design is the Revelation Principle. It
states that any social choice function that can be implemented by any arbi-
trary mechanism, can also be implemented by a truthful, direct-revelation
mechanism with the same equilibrium outcome. A direct-revelation mech-
anism is where participants declare their types to the mechanism, resulting
in a set of transfers, and a decision. This type of mechanism is "truthful" if
participants reporting their true preferences is a dominant strategy for the
participants. Such mechanisms are also referred to as truthful, incentive
compatible (IC), or strategy-proof.
Constrained Optimization in Mechanism Design
How does one wishing to construct a mechanism ensure the creation of
a "good mechanism". Much literature has been written regarding system-
atic methods of producing mechanisms. The process of creating a mecha-
nism is analogous to solving a constrained optimization problem. The goal
being trying to maximize an objective function, under a set of constraints.
There are a plethora of constraints used in designing mechanisms, and their
coverage if our of scope for this paper. However, here are just a few,
1. Incentive Compatible
2. individual rationality - no agent loses by participating in the mecha-
nism
3. Budget Balancing and Weak Budget Balancing
A challenge that arises from mechanism design is that some constraints
are often impossible to simultaneously satisfy under incentive compatibil-
ity; several impossibility theorems have been proven to demonstrate this.
Upon imposing constraints, several mechanisms are usually available to
choose among. Overall, mechanism design enables us to make assumptions
about the behavior of participants within the environment. The weaker
behavioral assumptions we impose, the more plausible our theoretical pre-
dictions on what happens in a system.
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1.1 Vickery Auction
In an auction, for which we’d like to compose a mechanism, If bidders bid
truthfully, then the auction maximizes Social Surplus, which by defini-
tion is just the sum of the values of the winners. In single auction, there is
one winner, so its just the value of the winner. Which can be Social surplus
can be defined as,
Social Surplus = Σvixi (4.2)
where vi is the valuation of the bidder, meaning how much they are
willing to bid, and xi is an indicator of whether or not participant i has
won. xi is 1 for the winner, and 0 for everyone else.
xi ≡
{
1 winner(xi) = true
0 otherwise
(4.3)
This concretely ensures the winner only pays the amount they bid.
1.2 Incentive Compatibility
Due to the Revelation principle, we can strictly represent Incentive Com-
patible (IC) mechanisms as defined through game theory-based mechanism
design.
Notation
We write a mechanism as, also as pi, depending on the text.
M = pi = (f, p1, . . . , pn) (4.4)
we define a social choice function as,
f : V1 × . . .× Vn → A (4.5)
Which maps from the set of preferences, to outcomes. Which is the
cartesian product among all individual preferences. Therefore a subset
contains an element from each of the participant preferences, each being a
ranking. Preferences are rankings in this sense, but can be any abstraction
of private information. This is private information held by a participant in
the economy in this context.
In Bitcoin, private information takes several forms. From a miners
perspective, upon successful mining, its newly found "Nonce" is private
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information at that time. Once submitted to the network, a mechanism
then possesses information regarding whether the submission warrants the
granting of a mining reward or not.
we defined Payment functions as,
pi : V1 × . . .× Vn → R (4.6)
which takes the preferences of the participants, and maps to a real
number. For demonstration we restrict this to a real valued scalar, but this
can take higher dimensions.
We also define the valuation function, vi ∈ Vi as,
vi : A→ R (4.7)
which maps an outcome to a real value. A mechanism, M , is Incentive
Compatible if and only if, for all i, and v−i (other participants):
1. Payment pi does not depend on vi, but only on the chosen social choice,
a ∈ A
2. M optimizes for each participant
If a participant has no incentive to misreport their type, or preference,
their incentives are compatible with the mechanisms goal. Since pi does
not depend on vi, for each outcome, there exists a payment, such that for
every valuation function, f(vi, v−i),
∀a ∈ A : ∃pa ∈ R : ∀vi ∈ Vi : f(vi, v−i) (4.8)
We can then define pa,,
f(vi, v−i) = a→ pi(vi, v−i) = pa (4.9)
If M optimizes for each player, then we define
f(vi, v−i) ∈ argmax
a∈f(v−i)
(vi(a)− pa) (4.10)
By M optimizing for each player, i, the mechanism further ensure no
incentive to misreport preferences, or types. However, this does not mean
misreporting type is uniquely the worst choice, but it does imply there will
be scenarios within which misreporting type is economically suboptimal.
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IC Definition
Dominant strategy incentive compatible means that a participant reporting
their true type, or bidder submitting their true bid, is a dominant strategy.
If a participant provides their true type, they are guaranteed non negative
utility by the mechanism used.
A mechanism (f, p1, . . . , pn) is called IC if for every player, ∀i, every
v1 ∈ v1, . . . , vn ∈ Vn and every vi′ ∈ Vi, if we denote a = f(vi, v−i) and
a′ = f(vi′, v−i), then vi(a)− pi(vi, v−i) ≥ vi(a′)− pi(vi′, v−i) [12] [13] [2].
Exploiting Mechanisms
The proposed system treats Mechanism as first class citizens, and enables
developers to create mechanisms, and use them as primitives. Additionally,
consensus within the system is constructed using at least one mechanism.
For example a simple Proof-of -Work (PoW)-style mechanism can be
designed by implementing a mechanism that accepts a Nonce as input, and
returns a boolean decision ("accept" or "reject"). Next we would build
a mechanism regarding longest chain wins, and the actions taken after
receiving a Nonce from another node, etc. Participants simply must invoke
the overall mechanism to retrieve a result from its parts. To implement
PoW-style consensus, we experimentally expose other data types, such as
a "Puzzle". Puzzles allow developers to create arbitrary computations
that accept solutions from participants. For simple PoW, with zL being
the number of leading zeros required, or "target value", that the resulting
solution hash shash must be lower than, the puzzle is:
substring(shash, 0, zL) = ”0 . . . 0” (4.11)
For every solution submitted, the protocol can check whether or not
this Puzzle has been solved by the candidate input. These are examples
of the application of mechanism design to the actual design of decentral-
ized economies. The platform discussed supports experimentation with
creating mechanisms. Current platform that enable "smart contract" al-
low developers to already create mechanisms. The proposed system allows
developers to design all mechanisms in the system, and not simply an addi-
tional mechanism atop several others – to construct decentralized systems
using mechanisms as foundation.
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Protocol & Platform
Mission
Figure 5.1: The architecture consisting of network nodes, both local to
an actor, and distrubuted, existing with additional, heterogeneous chains
operating from the same protocol.
This article proposes a system to enable customization of decentral-
ized protocols, create a cryptoeconomy implementing the designed protocol
configuration, usage of that economy’s properties as a usable data type in
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modern, arbitrary programming practices, and an example of a program-
ming language purposed with creating and interacting with the deployed
blockchain.
Due to the inherent tribalism regarding the "best protocol" wins zeit-
geist of today, the status quo moves more towards generalized, multipur-
pose, single design protocols. The opposite being a specialized protocol
design for every unique solution, given certain common fundamental de-
sign factors. The specialized blockchain implementations tend to be built
on top of an existing single design protocol, or lacking usefulness outside
of the context for which it was designed, without massive refactoring, and
redesign.
This effort also emphasizes the need for a process for creation, deploy-
ment, and management of any protocol implementation. We believe there
is much room for experimentation with decentralized architectures, both
purely decentralized, and semi-decentralized; zealots for the former often
miss opportunities for innovation along the way.
Conceptually, we wish to formulate an abstract machine purposed with
deterministically producing a dedicated cryptoeconomic protocol from a set
of properties.
We define a cryptoeconomic protocol as a mechanism consist-
ing of a goal function, and environment
1.1 Notation
As convention, we denote an arbitrary blockchain as B,
B ≡ (B0, . . . , Bn) (5.1)
consists of several, sequentially linked blocks, Bh, n being the number
of blocks in a chain, indexed by the height of the block, h. Each B contains
various values relevant to the context of B,
T ∈ T , T ≡ BnT ≡ T (Bn) (5.2)
the transactions, in the conventional sense, for a given block can be
denoted by BnT or T (Bn), but represents all transactions in a given block
B. The block header, Bh can contain various types of information, but
at least has to contain all a presentation of all T belonging to it, usually
representing by hashing the set of transactions, or a Merkle Tree (CITE)
root hash of all T in B.
∀B,Bh ≡ (. . . H(T0, T1, . . .)) (5.3)
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B is generated through computational means, and finalized through a
block-finalization state transition function is defined as,
Π(σ, B) ≡ Ω(B,Υ(Υ(σ, T0), T1) . . .) (5.4)
with Υ being a protocol’s state transition function, and Υ being the
transaction-level state transition function. Upon finalization of Bh, Ω, the
protocol can choose to reward an account – either through nomination
(privilege reward), or by mining (value reward), depending on the consensus
properties of B designated by the implementing developer. Π denotes the
overall state transition function for B.
1.2 Blockchain Types
We expose a set of customization configurations for developers to choose
between. This set is intended to be grown over time, as the academic
literature grows on blockchain protocol design. Among these configura-
tion options, we define two variants of blockchain types, Btype, intended to
represent fundamental blockchain design concepts:
1. Type
(a) Unspent Transaction Output - BU
(b) Account Based - BA
A goal is not to restrict developers to one Blockchain type, or try to
develop a protocol attempting to generalize them all, but to give developers
the choice of Btype, and grow the amount of choices as the Blockchain
Ecosystem grows, and exposing the common factors of Btype.
1.3 Object Gender
Consulting the Bitcoin implementation, the notion of inputs and outputs
is a central theme to its transaction model; we can abstract away the idea
of unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs). Bitcoin transactions take on the
form of an output, or an input. Specifically to the Pay-to-Public-Key-Hash
(P2PKH) model, outputs contain Public Key hashes of a targeted account,
a, denoted as H(Kpublic[a]), from which to prove an account can rightfully
redeem a unit owed to it.
Inputs contain an account’s signature, asignature, consisting of private
key encryption of the transaction, followed by a hash of the encrypted re-
sult, and their full public key, Kpublic[a]. Bitcoin Script (CITE) then hashes
the public key given to it by the redeeming account, H(Kpublic[ar]), to verify
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the account’s entitlement to the unit. Abstracting away the concept of an
input, and an output further, we can apply it to other protocol types. For
this, we use Object Gender, G, as used, in subscripts, to classify a "trans-
action" in general. Some blockchain protocols purposely avoid gender in
their design. For example, Ethereum’s Ommers nomenclature is purposely
derived from the gender neutral concept of a sibling, and "Ommer".
Differences inG refer to the object/transaction "accepting" invocation,
or the object "performing" the invocation. This configuration enables the
property of sequence regarding transactions, and can be "self-illustrated"
by its nomenclature. This implicitly enables a notion of time to be cap-
tured, and inherently forms a "history" of objects occurring in B. For
simple transactions, their can exist only one combination of a female-to-
male pair. However, this can generalize into a one-to-many relationship
between females and males (similar to Bitcoin’s MultiSig), and even more
complexed mechanisms. More on this is covered in section 1.2.
This property can hold for a simple Asset Transfer blockchain, BU
with no denominations, and a static value for each T , as the transactions
are simplified versions of a UTXO transaction, with only a 1-to-1 corre-
spondence of males and females. With BT , each transaction contains only
one female, for inserting an asset in B, and one male for invoking an asset
in B, for transfer, or validation, etc. The male invocation can result in a
myriad of operations occurring, all defined by the B specification created,
and the virtual machine’s execution upon the invoking transaction. This
is covered more in the section on the Virtual Machine implementation.
In an account-based chain, BA, such as Ethereum, differences in G
exists in the code execution processes. Upon a contract code creation func-
tion, Λ, being executed, the transaction used is here referred to as Female,
f , one that accepts invocation. The addressing in Ethereum specifies an
account’s address, [a], of which can represent an account to be referenced
within the network, a 20-byte hash, B20, and an empty byte set, B0 for
a "smart contract"; of which theoretically have the same capabilities in
Ethereum, by design. Instead, we simply use H(T ) to refer to "targeting" a
transaction, to(T ). Generally, Tm targets Tf , but we can link transactions
for deeper invocation.
With Ethereum, the contract creation code, c, executes one time only,
and returns the body of the contracts code to be stored, and executed every
time the contract receives a message in the network, or is invoked from a
future transaction, referred to as a "message call". More on Λ is covered
in section 1.5.
The message calls, Θ, to an existing contract, post creation, can be
viewed as Male transactions, m. These transactions execute the f transac-
tion it is referring to, and uses the data passed by m as the parameters, mp,
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to the f code being executed. More on Θ is covered in section 1.5. Param-
eters in Bitcoin are simply concatenated to the output in the transaction,
and the concatenated bitcoin script code is executed on that.
Drawing analogy from electrical, and mechanical engineering, G can
be viewed as similar to "headers" at the wire tip of certain electrical com-
ponents. m header pins are extruding, for the purpose of inserting into f
header sockets. Due to differing nomenclature between protocols regard-
ing objects or transactions accepting, and triggering invocation, referring
to G allows us to completely abstract away object and transaction types,
regardless of protocol today; this may change over time.
1.4 Value
In cryptoeconomics, one must incentivize computation, or the securing of
the chain through time; an agreed upon method is required for the trans-
ference of value within the network, whatever is the definition of value for
that network. The answer to this has traditionally been to formalize an
arbitrary currency, along with a set of rules to govern its usage within the
network.
We purposely abstract away the notion of "value" for the purpose of
generalizing its definition. Using this, we can construct an instance within
which value is a currency, or an asset, or privileges, and so on into the
imagination of the developer.
V alue in a given cryptoeconomy is defined by the implement-
ing developer. Thus we do not limit the game theoretic applica-
tions of the protocol.
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Chapter 6
Protocol Customization
Figure 6.1: The technology stack used
Configuration Layers
As a lesson taken from the computational simulation world, we can
construct hyperparameters around any blockchain protocol, assuming the
founding developers allow it, without breaking "honesty" in the network.
We do not separate these hyperparameters into mutually exclusive roles,
but categorize them into three layers of customization for design purposes.
Though overlap can exist between them, this serves as a heuristic towards
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designing the protocol design process. This is not proposed as the correct
way to do this, but serves as a starting iteration on the approach of mod-
ularizing protocol design aspects into a configurable set of state machines.
The three layers of customization we focus on are:
1. Actor/Node - A
(a) Consensus
(b) Mechanisms
2. Blockchain - B
(a) Type
(b) Roots (set)
i. Aspects
(c) Hashing Algorithm
3. Virtual Machine - V
(a) Operation Codes
(b) Compute Constraint
Therefore any chain created must be characterized by the cartesian
product,
Create : A× B× V→ B (6.1)
The overall goal of the protocol is to satisfy the relation,
∀B,B ⊂ A× B× V (6.2)
1.1 Actor
For actor specific customization, developers can choose the type of choice
model (uncoordinated/coordinated) the network uses. There are also prop-
erties to customize that may lie between the Actor and Blockchain config-
uration layer. For example, choosing the consensus to use isn’t exclusively
relating to either one, but affect both. We believe consensus will continue
to be a widely experimental property of any blockchain network. For this
reason, this project lends itself towards supporting continued experimen-
tation with newer, and emerging approaches.
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1.2 Chain Type
We initially expose two fundamental chain types, both with the same level
of customization, and the same level of code execution capabilities. We
define both, and eventually many, instead of one, as there still exists schools
of thought around the "better" approach on chain type.
Unspent Transaction Output
Inspired by the original Bitcoin, an unspent transaction output (UXTO)
chain requires each T to be spent, must contain a male segment. Upon
a male invoking the female segment of T , it creates at least one, or more
female segments, of which the sum of female segments equals the value, V
stored in the female segment being invoked. Ignoring fees, upon spending
of a transaction, the following inequality holds,
∑
V(f) ≥
∑
V(m) (6.3)
By definition in a UTXO style blockchain, since each output requires
an input to be spent, the maximum amount of Tm allowed to invoke the
entire transaction is the total number of Tf ,
A simple asset transfer type is a UTXO type with static value per
transaction, and a 1-to-1 transaction relationship, unless supporting multi-
transfer. Every transaction is either a female, or male, and corresponds to
one of the opposite gender. This can be used for simple asset exchange.
Account Based
An account-based chain type maintains a world state, σ, representing the
state tree, of which is implemented as a key-value store of accounts, a, of
which each corresponding to a specific account, and its world state, σ[a].
This world state is usually stored locally to the node – contrary to being
stored "on chain" as is popular belief.
For efficiency, Ethereum tracks a state tree (specifically, a trie data
structure), holding all account states in the network; contract code on the
chain are also included in the state, as they maintain the same capabilities
as user accounts.
LI
(
(k, v)
) ≡ (KEC(k), RLP(v)) (6.4)
They define a "collapse function" around LI for the set of key pairs
in this tree. This is the fundamental representation held in the Ethereum
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network at the time of writing. Developers can choose to deploy a pri-
vate chain, and not inherent meaningless world states from the network.
However, as mentioned before, this requires abiding by the implemented
protocol, and allows no room for flexibility without breaking "honesty", or
requiring reverse engineering of the protocol itself.
Developers should be able to define their own world states to exist in
the network, without being required to inherent every other world state by
other users irrelevant to their ecosystem, and without unnecessary devel-
oper friction hindering new developers.
1.3 VM
The role of a virtual machine is to simulate the execution behavior of
a computer, within a specific context. The majority of protocols today
implement their own, custom virtual machine (if any), for the purpose of
powering a proprietary scripting paradigm upon which their protocol runs.
These protocols fall victim to the same single-design mentality as the
core implementation requires, with little-to-no level of customization to the
developer community, without causing hard forks in the network. Develop-
ers can customize the opcodes being executed within the virtual machine,
although we aim to expose an expressive VM with which to begin.
Additional security concerns exist this, but are navigable through best
practices; this proposal can still exist in its entirety without the capability
to customize the underlying virtual machine.
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Abstracting Block Roots
Figure 7.1: Aspects are dynamic variables used in the system, and they
are associated with a Root
Root Instances
Designs have implemented developer-chosen Merkle Trees (or tries),
and Merkle Roots to store families of data, and sequences. The decision of
what to use a Merkle Tree for should be left up to the developer, and not
taken at face value. For example, keeping record of the "Ommers hash", or
hash of the "uncles" within Ethereum’s design may make sense for it, but
should’t be taken as a generalized design choice required for a blockchain
powered application. The choice of Merkle trees, and roots to include in
a block’s header (in the case of merkle roots), and in the body of a block
on full nodes (optionally, merkle trees) should be left to the implementing
developers, not the platform.
As stated before, the merkle Root of the transaction merkle tree in
a block is hashed, and included in a block. This serves as cryptographic
proof of any transaction in that tree. Every other root included in a block
(transaction root, state root, receipt root, etc), is included for the same
purpose of "proving" it occurred, or existed. Other protocols also use
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hashing of the root of a tree data structure to "prove" existence of an
element within the tree. We abstract away the idea of a Root in a chain
header. This can satisfy the requirements for keeping track of State, σ,
and T .
The abstraction of a Root allows us to expressively generalize
the information intended for inclusion in any B.
We define an abstraction of T that can appropriately represent the
objects that invoke change in a state machine. In the case of Bitcoin, a
root instance, would be the general transactions, with the root being user-
defined as "Transaction". However, we can represent additional examples
of arbitrary roots to include in B, such as the storage, receipt, and trans-
action treis in Ethereum. These are still sets of objects, from which we
can execute logic. The way a protocol handles a storage root, is the same
as handling a transaction root, but we execute different functions from the
instructions represented by its respective root, of which is user-defined, in
the specification of their B.
1.1 Male
A male object simply invokes a female object. Male objects "spend" trans-
actions in a Bitcoin case, and in an Ethereum implementation can serve as
any execution of a smart contract, after it has been deployed, or "invoca-
tion". For deeper invocation, we can define subinvocation by either f or m
root instances.
1.2 Female
From an Ethereum perspective, the smart contract "creation" function
serves as a female object. We deem this as female, as it accepts invocation
from male objects. In the bitcoin sense, female root instances represent
transaction outputs awaiting inputs.
1.3 Root Sets
For each block B, we include a Root Set, R, defined as a set of hash
values, each of which belong to the indexed, developer-defined root. This
is designed to prove any root instances belonging to its respective root, in
a chain.
We define Γ as the set of Root Instances, and Γr is the set of root
instances belonging to their respective root, r, of which is included in a
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block, B, along with the hash of the root node of the merkle tree of Γr,
H(TreeRoot(Γr)).
∀γ, γ ∈ Γr, γ ≡ {γn, γt, γa, γc, γu, γA . . .} (7.1)
Where γn is the name of the root, γt is the type of the root, and γa
is the access option on the root, denoting whether the root is private, or
public, γc is the code defined in the root, γu is the return instructions for the
root, and γA is the set of Aspects (more on Aspects covered in "Aspects").
∀rk ∈ R, H(Γrk) (7.2)
The set of roots R, is created by the configuration of B. The cardi-
nality of the set of roots, |R|, is defined as the amount of roots, k, created
by the implementing developer.
∀r ∈ R, r = H(Treeroot(Γr)) (7.3)
Developers are given the options to define Roots as a part of the pro-
tocol design process. We can record a history pertaining to these roots,
and the behavior of related root instances over time.
Root Instances have properties, of which we can use for several tasks.
For example, if γG = m, γ must contain γp, the partner identifier, a hash
of the female partner, H(p(γ)) – can be arbitrary, but an relationship needs
to be made from m→ f .
Υ(σ, γ) ≡
{
execute(γ) γt = f
search(G, H(p(γ))) γt = m
(7.4)
where f is a root instance belonging to the female class, andm belongs
to the male class. If γt is f , we simply execute on γ, and if γt is m we first
search for mp, where p is partner of γ, found by referencing the partner’s
hash, H(p); if no p is found, throw an error. If we find mp, the protocol
attempts to prepare the root instance for execution, and allowance into the
network.
We can define simple and advanced security properties around this
constraint. For example,
∀γm,
{
error p(γ) = ∅
execute(γf ∪ γm) otherwise
(7.5)
This approach enables a layer of security around the user-defined spec-
ification for B. No γ type will be executed beyond those of which the im-
plementing developer specifies. Any γm that does not reference a γf will
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not be executed, and any male that does not "honestly" invoke a γf will
also not be executed. We can also impose more restrictions if needed, such
as:
1. if f already has been paired with another m
2. if the parameters of m are valid to pair with f
Each γ contains a segment of code to be executed, c, but its results
are handled differently. We highlight the different handlers for each chain
type:
1. UTXO - The result of code execution "spends" a specific female, by
pairing a fγ, followed by at least one m. If denominating the out-
puts, multiple females are created, for each intended "Receiver" of the
denominations.
2. Account Based - The code execution result is stored in the σ[a]s if γ is
a f , to be invoked later by a m, and stored as the result of invocation
by a m. This enables root instance-level log receipts. This differs from
the separate Root for them included in each B, as in Ethereum, but
one can easily create another r specifically for receipts. We make no
designation regarding where to store r information, and γ.
1.4 γ for UTXO
In Bitcoin, the parameters of m are the transactions signature, and the
receiver’s full public key. This is explained in the Bitcoin developer guide
as Signature Script. The receiver’s full public key is hashed to verify with
the public key hash in the previous output. The node also checks the hash,
and encryption (signature) by the receiving address to verify entitlement.
1.5 γ for Account Based
Using an Account Based architecture, each m and f γ represent some
execution, either code creation, f , or code invocation, m.
1.6 Female
For γf , we define a a transition function,
(σ′, z,o) ≡ Λ(σ, γf , s, o, v, c) (7.6)
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where σ is the current state, z is the virtual machine status code, o
is the log result for γf , s is the source of γf , usually an account, o is the
original creator, mostly s, v is the value, if defined in the specification of
B, and c is the byte array of code in γf . A is the substate, existing prior to
execution of γ. We can add depth by analyzing substate in-between root
instance executions.
1.7 Male
For γm, we define an invocation function Θ
(σ′, z,o) ≡ Θ(σ, γm, s, o, r, c,d) (7.7)
where z is the receipt of γ, o is the result of γ, s is the sender of the
root instance, o is the originating account of the partner γf root instance,
r is the receiving/targeted account a, usually the hash of the partnered
root instance, H(γf ), c is the code in the root instance, and d is additional
data. Similar to γf , we can add depth by utilizing substate between root
instance executions.
1.8 Aspects
Every γ defined in the speciication contains at least one Aspect, γA. An
aspect can be viewed as a variable for any γ belonging to a Root to refer-
ence. Aspects can also be referenced by any γ that does not belong to the
respective root, but this must be defined in the specification for B.
As illustrated in figure 7.1, Aspects are a part of a Root. Within the
system, developers can make constant variables, and dynamic variables.
Theoretically, constant variables can be included in genesis, or by a later
Root Instance, but will never change their value. Comparatively, Aspects,
being dynamic, exist on chain, and can be updated. Aspects are included
in roots for scoping purposes, but one Root, can access another Aspect
through invocation.
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Consensus Layer
Consensus
Today, there exists a myriad of research literature on several consensus
algorithms – from Proof-of-Work, to Proof-of-Stake, to Proof-of-Burn, and
more. However, for platform developers to not allow subsequent developers
to easily choose which consensus algorithm to use lessens developer experi-
ence. Consensus is a property that can traverse the Actor, and Blockchain
layers of customization. Consensus can also span the VM layer as well, but
can be constrained to the Actor layer. There is no such thing as a univer-
sally "better" consensus algorithm, of which provides fuel for arguments
regarding which ones are "better".
1.1 Consensus as Constrained Optimization
We, along with others, claim solving the problem of reaching consensus is
analogous to solving a constrained optimization problem. We can define
the problem with the desired state we wish to reach over the variables
considered during consensus.
For example, if we want to arrive at simple consensus, among nodes
in a network regarding the current time, we can construct several schemes
to do, regarding a myriad of variables, in addition to the current. We can
attempt to take an average of all the times reported among nodes. We can
also add a measure of geometric distance each node is from each other, and
so on. We claim the space of possible consensus variables across which we
can construct a consensus mechanism is large.
Once we decide upon a set of variables we wish to consider during
consensus rounds, the problem then becomes a constrained optimization
problem. Borrowing from an approach taken by the No Free Lunch theorem
for static over optimization algorithms, for any pair of algorithms a1 and
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a2
ΣfP (d
y
m|f,m, a1) = ΣfP (dym|f,m, a1) (8.1)
Based on the No Free Lunch theorem, we apply the support to design-
ing consensus mechanisms,
Theorem 1 Let C be a finite set of consensus algorithms, c ∈ C, and c
be a consensus algorithm, f be a function upon which consensus is desired,
m be iteration steps (i.e decision rounds), l be latency, and e be agree-
ment error, for any performance measure, Φ(l, e), the average over all f
of P (dym|f,m, c) is independent of c
where dym denotes the ordered set of sizem of the cost values (deviation
from consensus, time to consensus, etc) y associated to input values x ∈
X, f : X → Y is the function being optimized and P (dym|f,m, c) is the
conditional probability of obtaining a given sequence of cost values, from
consensus algorithm c, runm times on function f . If an algorithm performs
well on a certain class of problems then it necessarily pays for that with
degraded performance on the set of all remaining problems. The space
of all samples of size m is (X × Y)m. In this paper, we only apply NFL
Theorem 1. NFL loosely that algorithm a1 must beat a2 on just as many
target functions (and associated datasets) as a2 beats a1. In theory, NFL
implies that no consensus mechanism can perform optimally over the entire
problem space.
Designing Consensus
We attempt to formally apply principles of mechanism design to de-
signing consensus. In other words, every consensus mechanism consists
of one or more mechanisms. Using this approach, we can natively design
consensus mechanism from first principles.
2.1 Using Mechanisms
We treat mechanisms as the fundamental building block for each consensus
algorithm. Using mechanisms, developers can define the properties of the
consensus layer.
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Virtual Machine Layer
Specialized Virtual Machine
As done in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and others, smart contracts execute
within a dedicated virtual machine. Inside the proposed virtual machine
exists customized operational codes (OpCodes). To design arbitrary op-
codes in the service of creating a turing complete language introduces more
security risk to any implementation. Instead of attempting to create a gen-
eral purpose blockchain protocol, we propose to extend the capability to
create a purpose-built blockchain protocol catering to the use case of the
developer, without propagating the risk of implementation errors onto the
developer.
1.1 Operation Codes
With systems such as Ethereum, the opcodes are embedded in the sys-
tem. "Bitcoin Script" enables for very limited customized scripting, and
Ethereum enables more, being turing complete. However, these opcode
design decisions are not to be made by regular users of Ethereum. A de-
veloper must fully attempt to fork the Ethereum codebase, and customize
on top of it, which can be an arduous task for any open sourced project
contributed to by hundreds of developers.
Instead of building on top of bitcoin, or Ethereum, the research allows
for developers to redesign bitcoin, redesign Ethereum, or more generally
design an arbitrary Cryptoeconomic network.
1.2 Code Execution
Socially, we define a smart object as any instance created by a developer
served with making a decision of some sort. Whether the decision be to
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retain specific information, calculate an arbitrary function, or consult the
world, external to the crypto-economic environment in-use (accessing the
"wet" world).
Gender-Based Execution
Upon a f Root Instance, γG = f , we define a code creation function as Λ, of
which computes on its parameters, the state γσ, the sender γs, originating
account of the female segment γo, and the instructions to be executed once
γi, of which is data, arbitrary in length.
When a m Root Instance is processed, γG = m, we define the code
execution function, denoted Ξ, evaluates to a tuple representing the subse-
quent state computed σ∗∗, a substate A, and the body code of the account,
c.
1.3 System VM
To operate, we must have some basic operations in the VM. These are
in addition to the Operation Codes created by the developer. These are
operations for basic arithmetic, cryptographic functions, and other core
computations supporting the protocol.
Smart Contract Templates
Figure 9.1: Showing how restricting the smart contract type that can be
computed upon naturally lessens the attack surface for a nefarious actor to
submit malformed smart contracts
With Ethereum, the default state of the system is to accept any smart
contract submitted by anybody willing to pay the required resources. In
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the security documentation, there exists ways to restrict transactions from
specific parties, or from the public, but these setting are experimental, and
not widely used.
As a consequence, developers must be concerned when deploying a
permissionless, public blockchain. This is because nefarious actors can
always submit any transaction they can imagine, with little consequences
beyond the resources paid to submit the transaction to the network.
1. SDMP: Single Design Multi-Purpose
2. FDSP: Flexible Design Single Purpose
A SDMP is a protocol that is designed to be multipurpose and general,
and the amount of "supported" computation types, and "acceptable" com-
putation types tends towards ∞. These protocol types have one specific
design, but users are encouraged to use the protocol "as-is".
With an FDSP protocol, the "supported" computation types also tends
towards ∞, but is bounded above by the implementing developer. This
means developers choose what computation are allowed to take place on
the network.
This system proposes a concept called "smart contract templating"
where implementing developers can specify the structure of all transactions
intended to be accepted, and computed upon within the network.
By design, any transaction that does not adhere to the tem-
plates set forth in the design of the protocol will not be computed
upon by the protocol
Θresult =
{
Θ(γ), if ¬ malformed(γ)
error, otherwise
(9.1)
These guarantees expose a smaller attack surface for the implement-
ing network, compared to the conventional general purpose protocol. Gen-
eral purpose protocols (implementing turing complete computation envi-
ronments) aim to enable users to create an infinite amount of computa-
tions. The difference with this proposal is the amount of computations is
bounded above by the protocol developer. For any protocol that accepts
all computations, the attack surface can be as large as the acceptable com-
putation space. Bounding the computation space above guarantees that
the protocol will only accept a subset of the computation space, of which
is decided upon by the implementing developer.
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This properties of the system ensure developers can safely deploy
public-facing, permissionless, purpose-built cryptoeconomies. If a devel-
oper wants to build a network to support decentralized elections, the devel-
oper should not have to concern themselves with whether or not a nefarious
actor will submit a rogue transaction, and attempt to exploit a bug writ-
ten in a previous transaction. Furthermore, the developer does not need
to worry about their network computing upon transactions that perform
other behaviors outside the scope of the intended election-based behaviors
decided upon. In essence, each chain holds its own transaction types.
Theoretically, this approach can ensure an attack similar to the fa-
mous "DAO Hack" cannot occur within the network – unless explicitly,
and mistakenly allowed by the implementing developers. Developers can
still make mistakes during implementation, but adequate developer tooling
can mitigate those issues.
Turing complete language-driven, general purpose blockchains, are sus-
ceptible to an infinite amount of attack surfaces, because turing complete
languages with no restrictions can be used to develop an infinite amount
of malicious sets of code.
This is largely due to the size of the Language L that can be repre-
sented using a turing machine. With any finite, non-empty, alphabet such
as A = {a, b} there are an infinite number of finite-length words that can
potentially be expressed: ”a”, ”aab”, ”bbabba”, ”aabbaabbaa”, etc.
Thus, formal languages are usually infinite, and describing
an infinite formal language is not as simple as writing L =
{”cat”, ”dog”, ”catdog”, ”dogcat”}.
The attack surface of a system is the sum of the various points where an
unauthorized user can attempt to attack an environment. For a language,
the attack surface is as infinite as L itself. We propose simply bounding
the attack surface above.
Theorem 2 Let S be the set of attack surfaces for a given application
A. If the application is designed to accept an infinite computations C,
any set of restrictions R placed upon the application, restricting a positive
number of computations, R(A), thereby decreasing the amount of acceptable
computations, decreases cardinality of S
in other words,
R(A)→ |S(A)| = |S(A)| −  (9.2)
where  is the number of computations no longer accepted after re-
striction. It is not the language that provides a smaller attack surface, it
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is the result of designing a purpose-built blockchain that accepts a subset
of all turing-acceptable computations that yields a smaller attack surface.{
if  > 0 |A| > |A| − 
 = 0 |A| = |A| (9.3)
We also assume restricting inputs to A do not result in more attack
surfaces. Platforms such as Ethereum maintain documentation on how
to further "secure" a blockchain (restricting certain accounts, etc), and it
is growing over time. However, we can render smaller attack surfaces by
design fundamentals, and not additional security measures entrusted upon
the developer.
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Graph-based Analytic Engine
Query Graph
Figure 10.1: An illustration of how we represent an arbitrary B as net-
work graphs, each chain varying in block height (left-to-right). This data
structure is used to query the chain. Black is the genesis block, B0, green
is any subsequent block, B0+, red is γf , and blue is γm.
A graph database is any storage system that provides index-free ad-
jacency. We use an ordered key-value store for root instance relationship
storage, and propose its use for any relational data to be extracted from a
chain. By using hexastores as the fundamental data store for each , we can
further optimize relationship queries.
Current protocols make use of external, but node-local storage to re-
trieve context, and additional information regarding the state of the world.
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This is a common practice across protocols, so we purpose local storage
for strategic technological advantages. In the case of relationship-based
querying upon a given B, a Graph model provides specific benefits, but is
not necessary for operation, and should be ultimately left up the designer
of the protocol.
Since we know the volume of transactions can be high in a blockchain
network, in the service of efficient search, and querying, we store all pro-
cessed root instances, discussed in section 1.5, in a graph database. One
thing that remains, is the need for querying the protocol to determine the
state of any given root instance.
When importing data into a graph database, the relationships are
treated with as much value as the database records themselves. This al-
lows the engine to navigate connections between nodes in linear time, with
respect to the tree depth required for traversal. That compares favorably
to the exponential slowdown of many "Join SQL" queries in a traditional
relational database.
Graph Model
We make use of the Subject S, Predicate P , Object triple store. This can
be generalized to include n-tuple stores. S, P, andO are configurable in
more advanced settings. Initially, we make use of the following predicates
for proof-of-concept:
1. Targeted
(a) Involves a transaction’s "to" field. If Alice sends value to Bob,
A→ Targeted→ B is the graph entry
2. Created
(a) Refers to the causer of the transaction, or the from field, A →
Created→ T
3. StoredIn
(a) Uses the transaction hash as the subject, and the block number
as the object, H(T )→ StoredIn→ Bnumber
4. Mined
(a) Mined(T ) , reflects what node mined the block containing the
transaction T, Node1 →Mined→ Bnumber
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The content in the triple stores is configurable for the implementing
developer. To represent A to B, through C, we write, A → C → B.
For look-up efficiency, we can store different possible permutations of this
relationship, and result in 6 unique triple stores accessible by key:
We store 6 keys for each triple:
1. spo: A→ C → B
2. sop: A→ B → C
3. ops: B → C → A
4. osp: B → A→ C
5. pso: C → A→ B
6. pos: C → B → A
For any Search function, on any graph, G , we simply use search(G).
For example to search for the existance of T in G, we write
search(G, T ) ≡
{
true if T ∈ G
false otherwise
(10.1)
Analytic Engine
We include an analytical layer of capabilities in the architecture for
the purpose of native, quantitative decision-making.
For example, if we want to determine the average block time for a given
B, we can create a vector, J , consisting of the timestamp, t, differences
between each block, bht
Σj1
|J | ,∀j ∈ J , j ≡ bj+1t − bjt (10.2)
Through the Analytic Engine, and programming language, we expose
many estimators for the purpose of decision making for developers.
2.1 Inter-Economy Analytics
With a common system powering many separate Blockchain economies,
the opportunity arises to provide analytic solutions that span across sev-
eral unique blockchain-based ecosystems. For example, to find a given
transaction, T , we can exploit fundamental search functions such as,
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contains(T, ((B1 ∪B2) \B3)) (10.3)
At the time of writing, the application of statistical analysis to cryp-
toeconomic systems is a growing field of research.
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Native Abstraction Language
Formal Language
To create a developer experience that resembles actual programming,
we expose an expressive, turing-incomplete formal language purposed with
allowing developers to represent their B specification as a programming
language. This language also allows developers to interact with the chain,
once active. This creates one common, fundamental language for designing
a blockchain protocol, and interacting with it.
1.1 Defining Data Types
A main goal of this work is to take developer experience into account in
the highest regard.
1.2 Data Type
The Integer Data Structure, for example is represented a specific way, and
you can call operations on it. This can vary based on the programming
language in use, but the notion of taking a concept such as an Integer, and
allowing higher level functions to be invoked upon it inspires the following
data types.
1.3 Blockchain Data Type
To configure a blockchain, the language expects usage of the Blockchain,
and Consensus symbols. These provide the functionality needed to con-
struct a blockchain design. The Root keywork is required for tasks such as
adding a new root.
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The simplest example, while still showing programmatic capabilities,
could be code snippet 1,
Listing 1 Simple chain creation
Blockchain B1(Consensus) {
this.consensus = Consensus.POW;
func Create(Config i, Status s){
log(" created ...");
return True;
};
func testFunc(Block b){
Nonce answer = (b.nonce);
log(answer);
}
func OnNewBlock(Block b, Hash h){
log(" Block ID: "+b.id);
log(" Block Hash: "+h);
Int number_result = testFunc(b);
log(number_result);
}
}
Since a chain is a data type, we can invoke upon it. To submit a new
root instance, we can call send, and pass our root instance as a parameter.
B1.send(...) (11.1)
To process a condition on whether a given root instance exists in a
chain, we can reference all on chain root instances, RI, and check for the
existence of one.
if(B1.RI.contains(...)){...} (11.2)
For the task of building a chain dedicated to elections, we must con-
figure the chain to accept new ballots, and cast new votes. This is demon-
strated in code snippet 2,
At the time of writing there does not exist a high-level programming
language specifically for the designing of a blockchain protocol. With such
an expressive language, we can lessen the blockchain development learning
curve. Assuming such a language does not instead make it more difficult
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Listing 2 Election chain creation
import ballot;
import verdict;
Blockchain election_chain(Consensus , Roots) {
this.consensus = Consensus.POW;
Roots.add(ballot);
Roots.add(verdict);
func Create (){
log('created ...');
};
func OnNewBlock (){
log("new block ...");
}
}
for developers to use. The aim of this language is to be the only mechanism
developers use to create, and interact with a given blockchain.
1.4 Root Type
Root represents objects to be tracked on the chain, by way of a tree con-
taining the objects. Each Root can have multiple Aspects used by it.
Listing 3 Root example for casting a vote
import votes;
Root root_name (){
AddAspect(votes)
...
}
1.5 Aspect Type
Aspects define variable types within Roots. The aspect’s root, and other
roots can access the aspect if allowed.
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Listing 4 Root aspects for casting a vote
Aspect votes{
description = "..."
default_value = 0
}
1.6 Mechanism Type
We use the Mechanism type to design algorithmic processes for the network
to follow. We can not only construct consensus mechanisms with this,
but additional network-related rules and processes. For example, we can
represent proof of work by using the mechanism type.
Listing 5 The structure of a mechanism, including several decision func-
tions
Mechanism proof_of_work{
SocialWelfare (){...}
SocialChoice (){...}
Valuation () {...}
...
}
By applying the mechanism to the chain configuration, we put it to use.
However, in addition to the fundamental consensus property of the chain,
we can also define, a additional rule. Each mechanism has native methods,
each triggered at different times. For example, the Execute method is
invoked every time the mechanism is invoked.
Listing 6 A native mechanism example with a triggered function
Mechanism say_hello{
Execute (){
log(" hello ");
...
}
}
The Execute function is native, and is invoked on when the mechanism
is executed; this too can be configured.
Mechanism Function Types
Each mechanism can implement several functions to accomplish various
goals.
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Upon a peer receiving a message from another, supposed a developer
wanted to invoke a simple condition that compared a scalar value from each
peer to decide what execution path the protocol should take.
Listing 7 Mechanism for ScalarCompare
Mechanism ScalarCompare{
OnPeerMessage(peer){
if (peer.message > 1){
Broadcast (" hello ")
}
}
}
With these paradigms, developers can build several custom mecha-
nisms into their deployed protocol specification.
1.7 Puzzle Data Type
Using a native puzzle data type, we can abstract the creation of computa-
tions of which participants can attempt to solve to further the creation of
an economy. This is arbitrary, and serves as an example of the types of ab-
stractions we can expose during the developer experience of constructing,
and designing blockchains.
1.8 Native Functions
By design, developers declare functions to be ran during several scenarios,
all of which are included in the genesis block for a chain. This provides a
single source of instructions to be computed. For example,
Listing 8 Chain function for OnNewBlock
func OnNewBlock (...){
...
}
is invoked upon every new block created in the network. Each node
runs this function if they create a new block. Other native functions in-
clude, but are not limited to,
1. OnCreate
2. OnNewPeer
3. OnBlockReceived
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Chain Functions
Each configuration file from which a chain is constructed can contain
sets of instructions to be computed during several scenarios during the life
of the chain. OnNewBlock is but one example of this, and can be arbitrary.
Chain functions differ from smart contracts because chain functions are de-
clared during chain creation time, and serve as "hard-coded" computations
of which occur at different times. Chain functions help dictate the behavior
of a chain, opposed to being declared by a smart contract. Smart contracts
serve as the providers of "input" into chain functions already declared in a
chain’s genesis. For security purposes, chain functions cannot be rewritten
once a chain is deployed into the "wild".
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On Protocol Properties
Protocol Properties
1.1 Node Transparency
Decentralization is a core aspect of a Blockchain ecosystem, however the
purpose of such an aspect is important to consider. Decentralization allows
nodes to arrive at agreement, with no central point of failure. Distributing
the nodes across the globe is not the only way to achieve decentraliza-
tion. For example, you can have a fully decentralized blockchain economy
of which only exists within one physical building. Ownership comes into
play when determining the decentralization of any network. This property
assumes the data, and the logic will exist on each node. Regardless on the
implementation, transprency of the data on a blockchain should never be
sacrificed. Moreover, it may not be necessary to exclusively couple logic,
and data onto every node.
1.2 Logic Separation
Blockchain ecosystem, since Bitcoin, have implemented systems within
which network nodes can either store all of the data, or a part of it. In Bit-
coin, these partial nodes are use the Simplified Payment Verification (SPV)
mechanism for validation of transactions. The proposal includes nodes that
only carry the data of the blockchain. Using Bitcoin as an example, the
"data" in this description can represent the "transactions" of their system.
The proposed system can separate Logic and Data, between nodes,
keeping all capabilities on each node, or enable a simplified mode similar
to SPV. Separating Logic and Data allows for not only a separation of
concerns but also for more transparency in systems that may be more
centralized than a pure decentralized implementation.
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We draw an analog to being "judged", or "the judger". Using this
design, some nodes (preferably nodes controlled by sole entities) can be
purposed with performing logic on data, while public nodes, can maintain
the data of a system. This relinquishes data-nodes from being concerned
with heavy computation, while still enabling public transparency into the
state of a Blockchain ledger. Cryptoeconomically, we can incentivize data-
nodes, and logic-nodes in different ways, of which we can yield to the
developers, if inquired to do so. We can also have a hybrid approach
where logic-nodes can store the data as well, peered with data-nodes to
keep them "honest". Once again, these decisions are far too complicated
to generalize, and should be decided by the implementing developer.
A concern arises regarding any logic-based node simply executing logic,
and can introduce a vulnerability. We can mitigate this, by design, by
enabling logic-based nodes to simply hold representations of the "source-
of-truth", the blockchain ledger, but only executing logic on the data passed
to it, but using it’s own data to validate they are equal.
1.3 Programmatic Usage Conventions
This article also proposes a simple developer interaction such as,
Blockchain b = new Blockchain(...) (12.1)
if we focus on an object oriented approach. This allows any object
oriented application to integrate with a fully-functional blockchain. The
proposed implementation would only need network dependencies, as the
system can be deployed in an enterprise manner. Considering a functional
approach can be,
var b = Blockchain(...) (12.2)
Both of these developer interactions aim for the least developer-
friction, with no sacrafice in decentralization, scalability, and security.
REST API
the system can also expose a REST-like Application Programming Inter-
face (API), for a more developer friendly experience. It can be arbitrary
regarding what functionality to expose through an API, but should be of
use to the developer invoking the protocol in use.
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1.4 Decentralized Nodes
When Bitcoin first began to propagate, anyone could mine on their com-
puter, due to the ease of mining at that time. Users of whom wanted to
maintain a wallet could do so on their computer as well. Over time, many
developers, and users of Bitcoin have begun to maintain their wallets on
a cloud server. At the time of writing, a large majority of "Segregated
Witness" Bitcoin nodes exist in Amazon Web Service instances (servers).
There does currently exist an appetite, and market for "cloud mining"
but has shown to be less profitable when compared to dedicated mining
equipment; this may be due to the fees charged for cloud mining services.
It has yet to be definitively shown whether cloud mining will be ben-
eficial for users, as it also depends on the protocol being mined, but users
maintaining their version of a blockchain’s history has already proven to
be useful, and has been a natural evolution of cryptocurrencies. This is
because maintaining a wallet does not require large amounts of computing
power, or storage that isn’t readily available on consumer grade hardware.
Rightfully so, this also depends on the protocol being represented by the
wallet. Because of this, we experiment with a semi-centralized architec-
ture, giving developers the option to choose hosting types, and rapidly
experiment.
Hosted Blockchain Economies
As of the time of this writing, cloud computing providers now offer ser-
vices to fully host specific protocol platforms, mainly Hyperledger, and
Ethereum. These services simply attempt to abstract away most of the im-
plementation details for these platforms. This does not allow the developer
to customize the properties of the network beyond the arbitrary variables
implemented by the protocol of choice. This is a step in the right direction,
but it is ultimately on the shoulders of the protocol developers to enable
protocol customization, and further simplification.
As covered in section 1.2, we can provide options to a developer re-
garding where they would like their nodes to exist, without sacrificing the
decentralization property required for any cryptoeconomic environment.
Similar to Bitcoin’s "Full", and SPV node types, we can tier the require-
ments for nodes to maintain the chain data locally. However, we can do
the same for computation privileges. Simplified nodes can be the nodes
holding the data to be computed on, while full nodes can hold reference to
it, but not it.
We can enable the option of allowing full nodes to keep a record of
the data, with which to verify incoming data from a "data node", but not
to compute upon it. Simplified nodes can also choose to keep a record of
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the data, from which full nodes do not compute, or verify; this allows for
simply keeping a synced record of the blockchain ledger used.
Developers should also be able to choose if they are indifferent to
whether they need to maintain any of the blockchain data/operations them-
selves. Either way, the blockchain in question should have the right tooling
to verify its cryptoeconomic properties are indeed holding true over time.
There are a subset of developers of which do not care to maintain, verify,
or manage the implementation of a Blockchain, and another subset that
want to make design decisions on the protocol itself, but do not care to
maintain it.
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Protocol Adaptation
Updating Code
With systems built upon arbitrary blockchain designs, they face the
difficult challenge of updating the code existing on the nodes in the wild.
This is famously difficult, and results in the platform developers requiring a
iterative-waterfall approach to their development releases. Developers must
attempt to predict the behavior of network participants, in attempts to "get
it right". This article proposes a system to simply store the version of a
given blockchain ledger, but also update the blockchain rules, allowing for
transitioning between code versions, without inconveniently interrupting,
or disturbing network operations and properties.
1.1 Rollovers
To rollover an existing chain onto a new version of the same chain, we store
a copy of the old chain, locally or remote, and hash its contents, H(B). We
then include the hash of the previous version’s Blockchain into the genesis
block of the new version. To hash a small chain, you can directly hash the
chain as a single data structure. However, for larger chains, it depends on
how the chain is stored. For a chain stored by several files on a system,
we can hash each file, and construct a tree, finally hashing it’s root. This
serves as the same "proof" of existence at the time of hashing.
Transactions per second
To alter transaction per second, we can, among other things, decrease
block mine/forge time, or decrease block size. What a network can achieve
depends on several aspects. First generation blockchain systems are con-
strained at the network level because a large part of the network partici-
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pates in transactions; this is different from the capacity of a single node. If
the network is viewed as a graph, G, the diameter of the network influences
how information propagates within it. For a single transaction, the amount
of time it takes to span all nodes from inception to finality also influences
this.
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Enterprise Deployment
Sole Enterprise Blockchain Usage
For a large corporation, that may not be interested in forming, or
joining a consortium, implementing a meaningful Blockchain ecosystem
may not make sense by today’s standard. However, instead of deciding
that using a Blockchain doesn’t apply, we can enable such a company with
a cloud hosted blockchain economy for experimentation. This enables an
on-going, ever-present blockchain network, upon which to store data, and
from which to fetch data.
State
"State" in bitcoin represents the state of the amount of money ebery-
one has, Ethereum uses state as how much money everybody has, what
is the code for smart contracts, and what is the state of all of the smart
contracts.
Development Operations
By considering developer experience, we can allow developers to
choose how much control they want over an individual node, or the en-
tire blockchain network. For developers who choose controlling their node,
there exists plenty of platforms in existence today. For developers who
want to deploy a blockchain protocol with minimal concerns regarding its
configuration, we can abstract away the need for protocol design, and en-
able developers to invoke/interact with an arbitrary blockchain, of their
creation, by simple programmatic syntax; this syntax can differ depend-
ing on the programming language used, but fundamentally, it can be of a
functional nature, or fully object oriented.
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Development Interface
For developers of whom want control over every aspect of the pro-
tocol’s design, we can extend an interface, be it user interface based, or
programmatic, to configure several aspects of the protocol’s design prop-
erties. Creating a developer interface is different from open sourcing a
project. Open sourced software, to extend its usefulness, inherently re-
quires the extending developer to edit the code of the platform. Implicitly,
this means the more complicated, robust a platform’s code base becomes,
the higher the effort becomes on the part of the extending developer. For
these reasons, we choose a purposed developer interface.
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